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There are two approaches to understand the issue of systemic risk and macroprudential 
regulation, one is empirical macroeconomics based, and the other is financial market based.  
These two approaches have different methodologies, emphases, and purposes. Nicolò and 
Lucchetta (2010) belongs to the macro-centric approach. It helps us to better understand the 
fundamental linkage between the real economy and the financial sector, especially in the long-
run. However, unlike a financial-centric approach, the paper is silent on the interaction among 
large banks, the nonlinear feedback effect, and the identification of individual institutions that 
are systemically important. 
 
1 Two Approaches to Systemic Risk 
There is a long tradition in the empirical macroeconomics literature (see, e.g. Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1998) that introduces the financial sector as a market imperfection into a 
real business cycle framework. Such an add-on approach typically labels the financial sector as 
an accelerator, multiplier, or amplifier, in that shocks into the economy come from the real side 
and are magnified by the financial sector. The recent financial crisis and deep recession have also 
prompted more research along this direction.
1 
This paper follows Nicolò and Kwast (2002) in defining systemic risk as the risk that 
either a real or a financial shock will trigger a significant decline in real activity. The systemic 
financial risk is measured as the value of risk (VaR) for the market adjusted return of a large 
portfolio of financial firms at 5 percent level, and the systemic real risk is measured by the 
similar GDP 5 percentile. The empirical implementation builds on the dynamic factor model of 
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1 One example is the Federal Reserve and JMCB Conference on Financial Market and Monetary Policy 
held in June 2009, which emphasizes the linkage between financial market and macroeconomy and the 
implications for monetary policy. 2 
 
Stock and Watson (2005) with quarterly data. For estimating systemic risks, GDP and financial 
VaR’s are estimated via quantile regressions, and can be explicitly related to the conditional VaR 
(CoVaR) framework advocated by Brunnermeier (2009). Empirical estimation consists of two 
steps: first, a standard dynamic factor approach is adopted to estimate the VAR parameters and 
to filter out the latent factors; then, the standard quantile regression is applied to the GDP and 
financial and impulse-response or stress testing is conducted. 
An alternative approach is to focus on the microeconomic structure of the financial 
industry, while treating macroeconomy only as a background. The CoVaR measure 
(Brunnermeier, 2009) looks the VaR of one portfolio conditional on the VaR of another 
portfolio, which focuses on the spillover effect from one bank’s failure to the safety of another 
bank or the whole banking system. The “Shapley Value” decomposition approach (Tarashev, 
Borio, and Tsatsaronis, 2009), constructed in the game theory, used by Tarashev, Borio, and 
Tsatsaronis (2009) allocates the systemic risk to individual banks by defining the contribution of 
each bank as a weighted average of its add-on effect to each subsystem of that bank. Huang, 
Zhou, and Zhu (2010) consider bank’s systemic importance as its marginal contribution to a 
hypothetical insurance premium of distress loss that a banking system may suffer. Such an 
intuitive method has advantages of being both subadditive, as opposed to the CoVaR measure, 
and simple to implement, as opposed to the Shapley value approach. 
 
2 Advantages and Disadvantages 
For the impulse-response analysis in empirical macroeconomics, typically the shocks to factors 
are extracted through othogonalization but without meaningful economic interpretations. This 
paper uses economic theory implied sign restrictions to help identify whether the real or financial 
shocks are coming supply side or demand side. A large class of general equilibrium monetary 
macroeconomic models can identify aggregate demand shock if both GDP and inflation 
responses are positive and identify aggregate supply shock if GDP response is positive while 
inflation response if negative (Canova and Nicolò, 2002). On the other hand, partial equilibrium 
banking models, (see, e.g., Boyd, Nicolò, and Loukoianova, 2009) can identify credit demand 
shock from positive responses in both bank credit growth and lending rate change and identify 
credit supply shock from positive response of bank credit growth and negative response of 
lending rate change. 3 
 
Such an identification scheme for shocks to the system generates meaningful empirical 
findings about systemic risk and stress-testing. For example, a common misunderstanding of the 
2007-2009 economic crisis is that it was caused by the credit crunch and de-leveraging, rather 
than the sharp declines in real activity since December 2007. With a rigorous identification 
scheme, this paper finds that in the long-run it is (always) the real shocks in final demand that 
ultimately determine the investment fluctuations, in association with the in- direct credit demand 
channel. And bank credit growth slowdowns are primarily the results of the declines in aggregate 
real demand, not the other way around. It is the most important finding in the paper, which also 
has implications for the financial-centric approach in systemic risk. For a financial crisis to have 
enduring effect on the business cycle, the crisis must be originated from the real economy. 
What is missing in such a macro-centric approach for systemic risk monitoring? One 
obvious problem is that by treating all the financial firms in one sector, the approach overlooks 
the interaction among large institutions, which is a main cause for this and previous financial 
crises. Also, by adopting the empirical macroeconomic VAR, the paper cannot address the 
nonlinear feedback effect that is instrumental in spreading fear during the recent financial 
turmoil. Lastly, but not the least, the macro-centric method cannot identify individual institutions 
that are deemed to be too-big-to-fail or systemically important. 
 
3 Alternative Financial-Centric Approach 
An alternative approach to systemic risk is a micro-based financial-centric one, with attention to 
individual firms’ asset correlations, leverage ratios, and liability sizes (Huang, Zhou, and Zhu, 
2009). Such a systemic risk indicator, a hypothetical insurance premium against catastrophic 
losses in a banking system, is constructed from real-time financial market data using the 
portfolio credit risk technique. The two key default risk factors, the probability of default (PD) of 
individual banks and the asset return correlations among banks, are estimated from credit default 
swap (CDS) spreads and equity price co-movements, respectively. Together with the banks’ 
liability sizes, these inputs effectively capture the three main ingredients missed by the macro-
centric approach—interconnectedness, leverage, and too-big-to-fail of large complex financial 
institutions. 
For the purpose of macroprudential regulation, it is important not only to monitor the 
level of systemic risk, but also to understand the sources of risks in a financial system. One 4 
 
perspective is to decompose the credit risk of the portfolio into the risk contributions associated 
with individual sub-portfolios (either a bank or a group of banks). As demonstrated by Huang, 
Zhou, and Zhu (2010), the total risk can be usefully decomposed into a sum of marginal risk 
contributions. Each marginal risk contribution is the conditional expected loss from that sub-
portfolio or a bank, conditional on a large loss for the full portfolio. It is important that the 
marginal contribution of each subgroup or bank adds up to the aggregate systemic risk. This 
additivity property is desirable from an operational perspective, because it allows the 
macroprudential regulation to be implemented at individual bank level. 
Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2010, Figure 3) shows that such a systemic risk indicator for 
twenty-two Asia-Pacific banks was very low at the beginning of the global crisis. The indicator 
then moved up significantly, reaching the first peak when Bear Stearns was acquired by JP 
Morgan on March 16, 2008. Things changed dramatically in September 2008 with the failure of 
Lehman Brothers. The distress insurance premium hiked up and hovered in the range of 150 and 
200 basis points (or 50-70 billion USD). The situation didn’t improve until late March 2009. 
Since the G20 Summit in early April 2009, the distress insurance premium has come down 
quickly and returned to pre-Lehman levels in May 2009. 
Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2010, Figure 8) further divide banks into six groups: Australian 
banks, Hong Kong banks, Indian banks, Korean banks, Singapore banks and banks from 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. In relative term, the marginal contribution of each group of 
banks was quite stable before mid-2008. Australian banks were obviously the most important 
ones and contributed the most to the systemic vulnerability. However, since September 2008, the 
relative contribution of Australian banks decreased substantially, whereas banks from Hong 
Kong and Singapore became more important from a systemic perspective. 
 
4 Summary 
To conclude, the macro-centric approach to financial systemic risk, as in Nicolò and Lucchetta 
(2010) among others, can help us better understand why the business cycle is ultimately driven 
by the shocks from the real side of the economy, especially in the long-run. However, such an 
approach lacks attention to details—asset correlation, leverage ratio, and too-big-to- fail—for 
identifying individual institutions that are systemically important. A micro-centric approach, as 
in Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009, 2010) among others, captures these missing ingredients critical 5 
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